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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
HAROLD EUGENE HARMON, : Case No. 20060027-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of Distributing a Controlled 
Substance in a drug free zone, to-wit: methadone, a first-degree felony in 
violation of U.C.A.§ 58-37-8. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2A-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF 
GUILTY? 
PRESERVATION: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by the 
timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea which was denied. (R. 090) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court in the case of State v. Mora, 
(2003 Ut App 117 If 16) has held: "The 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a 
1 
privilege, not a right. . . [and] is within the sound discretion of the trial court.' 
State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). Thus, 6[w]e review a trial 
court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.' State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)." 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; 
or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results 
in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 
37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons 
with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, 
supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance 
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty 
of a second-degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is 
guilty of a first-degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of 
a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is 
guilty of a second degree felony; or 
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(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in 
his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the 
court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition 
or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect 
to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled 
substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
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(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin 
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but 
less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) 
subsequent to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be 
sentenced to a one-degree greater penalty than provided in this 
Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all 
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or 
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of 
confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to 
controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to 
run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) 
is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in 
an offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having 
in his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
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(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a 
negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 
76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or 
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, 
or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or 
dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, 
deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, 
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness 
of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to 
render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug 
Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act 
is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
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(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution 
or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure 
or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections 
(4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 
76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, 
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an 
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in 
Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first-
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five 
years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for 
this subsection would have been a first-degree felony. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection 
(4), a person convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is 
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
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(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person 
who, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation 
of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older 
at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; 
nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act 
occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that 
the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection 
(4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, 
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, 
distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie 
evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of 
the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the 
substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled 
substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or 
research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
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(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall 
be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rule 11(e) 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may 
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
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(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, 
if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was originally charged with the crimes of manslaughter 
in violation of UCA §76-5-205, two counts of distribution of a controlled 
substance in a drug free zone, in violation of UCA § 58-37-8, and possession of 
drug paraphernalia a class A misdemeanor in violation of UCA §58-37a-5. A 
preliminary hearing was held on May 17, 2005, and the trial court took the 
manslaughter charge under advisement subject to memoranda from both sides. 
On July 20, 2005, the court dismissed the manslaughter charge and bound the 
Defendant over for trial on the remaining charges. Meanwhile, the Defendant 
had also been charged in a separate information with the charge of possession 
with intent to distribute a controlled substance on another occasion in violation 
of UCA § 58-37-8. That charge was also a first-degree felony based on the fact 
that it also was alleged to have occurred in a drug free zone and it was alleged 
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that the Defendant had prior convictions. The Defendant was also charged with 
other lesser charges, which were ultimately dismissed as part of the plea 
bargain. 
On August 31, 2005, the Defendant changed his plea pursuant to a plea 
negotiation in which the Defendant pled guilty to the first degree felony 
distribution charge and the prosecution dropped the drug free zone language on 
the second first-degree felony possession with the intent to distribute charge, 
making that a second degree felony to which the Defendant pled guilty. 
On September 7, 2005, the Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw 
his plea. (R. 090) A hearing on that motion was held on September 14, 2005. 
At that hearing the Defendant elected to withdraw his motion with respect to 
the second degree felony case, but wanted to go forward on the motion to 
withdraw his plea on the first degree felony charge. A hearing was set for 
October 5, 2005, on that motion, at which time the court instructed both sides 
to prepare memoranda on the issue. 
On November 9, 2005, the court denied the Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea based on the statement in advance of guilty plea 
signed by the Defendant and based on the plea colloquy in open court prior to 
the taking of the guilty plea. 
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The Defendant was sentenced on December 12, 2005, to an 
indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of not less than five years that may 
be for life. (R. 117) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 3, 2004, the police went to the house of the Defendant to 
investigate the death of Mr. Gordon. He had died earlier in the evening of 
August 3ld. The officers talked to the Defendant, and after reading him his 
Miranda rights questioned him about the death. (R. 146/23) The Defendant 
said that Mr. Gordon had repeatedly asked him for some methadone to calm 
him down and then admitted giving Mr. Gordon some of his methadone 
"because he was in such a state I couldn't turn him down". (R. 146/ 23) The 
Defendant admitted that he had observed Mr. Gordon smoke speed and some 
cocaine on Sunday night, August 1, 2004. (R. 146 / 23) Testimony of Detective 
Reeves confirmed that the death occurred within 1000 feet of a drug free zone. 
(R. 146/45) 
Further investigation revealed that the Defendant had received the 
methadone from a clinic in Bountiful, and that on January 22, 2004, the 
Defendant had signed a form in which he acknowledged that he had been given 
a booklet that had information regarding the use of his methadone prescription. 
The booklet instructs the user not to share the methadone with anyone since 
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they may not have built up a tolerance to the drug. It also related that the use 
of methadone alone or in conjunction with other drugs could "create a life 
threatening hazard." (R. 146 / 29, 26) 
On August 4, 2004, Dr. Frikke of the Utah State Medical Examiners 
office conducted an autopsy on Mr. Gordon and determined that he had died of 
drug poisoning from a combination of methamphetamine, methadone, and 
cocaine. (R. 146 /7 ) Dr. Frikke opined that it was possible that the single 
dosage of methadone may have been capable of causing death; but that it was 
the combination of the drugs that most certainly caused the death of Mr. 
Gordon. (R. 146 / 12-14) Dr. Frikke also discovered that Mr. Gordon did not 
have a prescription for any of the above listed drugs. (R. 146/14) 
In a separate information the Defendant was charged with the crime of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. On August 31, 
2005, the Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea negotiation to one first-
degree felony distribution of a controlled substance in a drug free zone (in 
conjunction with the Mr. Gordon case) and to one amended count of 
distribution of a controlled substance, a second-degree felony in the other case. 
On September 9, 2005, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
plea on the first-degree felony charge (electing to accept the second-degree 
felony plea taken at the same time), and a hearing was held on November 9, 
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2005. At that hearing the Defendant told the court that the reason for his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was "ineffective assistance and diligence." 
(R. 149/3) The Defendant told the court " Well, he, you know, he - we were 
going to trial on the, you know, on the other thing - and he never even 
mentioned these - going to trial on this other stuff, know what I mean, and I 
told him I wanted to go to trial on it. I said Fm not guilty, you know." (R. 149 / 
3) The court explained to the Defendant that a motion to withdraw a plea 
would be granted based only on what was said in open court and what was 
contained in the plea statement. The court explained to the Defendant that it 
recalled asking him if he had had enough time to talk to his attorney. (The 
court had in fact asked, "Have you had enough time to talk to [your attorney] 
about this plea? to which the Defendant said yes. And " do you need any more 
time." to which the Defendant said ano." (R. 145 /10)) The court also noted 
that the Defendant had signed a statement in advance of a guilty plea in open 
court. (Addendum B) 
The trial court then asked for additional grounds to which the Defendant 
replied, "I just didn't feel like I was, you know, justly represented." (R. 149/4) 
The court inquired why the Defendant had said "no" when asked if he needed 
more time to talk to his attorney, and the Defendant stated, "Because I was 
scared, to be totally honest with you. I mean I was, your honor, I really was." 
13 
(R. 149/4) The Defendant told the court, " I guess like what he tells you back 
[in the holding cell adjacent to the courtroom] ... is totally different than what 
he says to you, I mean, how can I, you know, I don't know -I don't know 
where I'm supposed to come up with the right words for you." (R. 149/5) 
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea based on 
the statement in advance of guilty plea signed by the Defendant and based on 
the plea colloquy in open court. (R. 149/7) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The determinative issue of the Defendant on appeal is whether the trial 
court improperly denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Based upon the Rule 11 colloquy conducted at the plea hearing, and based 
upon the fact that the defendant executed and acknowledged reading and 
understanding the statement in support of guilty plea document, the trial court 
properly followed the requirements of Rule 11. 
After having reviewed the case law together with all these factors, 
defense counsel has been unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal. 
For this reason, this brief is being filed in accordance with the guidelines set 
forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d (Utah 1981). 
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ARGUMENT 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11(e) provides a guideline that 
a trial court must follow in the taking of a plea of guilty. The application of this 
Rule has been held by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to require strict 
compliance. In the case of State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2000) the Court held: 
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring 
that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with 
when a guilty plea is entered." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 
558 (quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)). 
The trial court must strictly adhere to Rule 11(e). See State v. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). (emphasis added) 
This "strict compliance" requirement replaced the former "substantial 
compliance" requirement before a plea can be taken. (See State v. Thurman, 
911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996) where the Court held, "Gibbons created a 'strict 
compliance' rule requiring that a trial court 'personally establish... that the 
defendant... understood the elements of the crime'".) 
The Rule 11 colloquy utilized during the taking of a plea of guilty must 
establish this "strict compliance" for each element of the plea. Although the 
extent of this strict compliance requirement has been recently reviewed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the cases of State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276 (Utah 2004) 
and State v. Corwell, 114 P.3d 569 (Utah 2005), the requirement of the court 
taking a plea of guilty remains one of strict compliance. In determining 
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whether each of these Rule 11 requirements were appropriately adhered to in 
the case at bar it is necessary to review each element in conjunction with the 
trial court's efforts at compliance. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e) provides " The court may 
refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, 
and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is 
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entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing 
any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is 
limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant 
on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors 
after the court has established that the defendant has read, 
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the 
defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the 
defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea, (emphasis added) 
In the case at bar the Defendant read and executed a statement in support 
of a guilty plea, (see Addendum B) That document clearly addressed each of 
the above elements of Rule 11 in great detail. The trial court asked the 
defendant if he had read the statement in advance of guilty plea to which the 
defendant said, "yes sir" (R. 145 / 9). The trial court described to the 
Defendant what he was pleading guilty to and the Defendant stated that he 
thought he was pleading to two-second degree felonies. The court told the 
Defendant that the proposal was to a second and a first, and asked "[Do] you 
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understand the difference?", to which the Defendant replied, " Yes, sir. Quite a 
bit different." (R. 145 9) The trial court then asked the Defendant, "No one's 
putting any pressure on you to enter this plea today?" To which the Defendant 
answered, "no, sir." (R. 145/9) The Defendant acknowledged that he had had 
enough time to talk to his attorney and didn't need any more time to talk to his 
attorney. (R. 145/10) 
The trial court and defense counsel then described the elements of the 
offense and the factual basis for the plea as follows: 
On August [2] 2004, you did knowingly and intentionally 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance or you agreed, 
consented, offered, or arranged to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, to wit: methadone. And the offense was 
committed in a public parking lot structure or within a thousand 
feet of any structure.. .The defendant shared his methadone with 
Cheyenne Gordon. It eventually caused Mr. Gordon's death. 
(R. 145/8) 
The trial court also went through the possible maximum sentence that 
could be imposed (R. 145 / 7). The trial court incorporated the statement in 
support of guilty plea into the record. (R. 145/9) 
At a hearing on the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the 
trial court found that all Rule 11 requirements had been met, that the Defendant 
knew and understood his rights at the time of the plea, and that the Defendant 
had knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas. 
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The only issue the Defendant wanted appealed, and under the 
circumstances the only issue the Defendant could appeal, was the voluntariness 
of the entry of his guilty plea. Since all the Rule 11 requirements were 
followed, and since the Defendant admitted in the hearing on his motion to 
withdraw his plea that he understood his rights, there are no possible violations 
on which to appeal. For these reasons, counsel respectfully requests 
permission to withdraw from further representation of the Defendant. 
The only claim that the Defendant makes regarding a knowing and 
intelligent entry of plea is a claim as follows: 
The trial court then asked for additional grounds to which the 
defendant replied, "I just didn't feel like I was, you know, justly 
represented." (R. 149/4) The court inquired why the defendant 
had said no when asked if he needed more time to talk to his 
attorney, and the defendant stated, "Because I was scared, to be 
totally honest with you. I mean I was, your honor, I really was." 
(R. 149/4) The defendant told the court, " I guess like what he 
tells you back [in the holding cell adjacent to the courtroom] ... is 
totally different than what he says to you, I mean how can I, you 
know, I don't know -I don't know where I'm supposed to come 
up with the right words for you." (R. 149/5) 
The Defendant does not claim that he was under the influence of any 
kind of drug or alcohol nor does he claim that he was not of a right mind. 
On February 22, 2006, appellant's attorney sent a letter to the appellant 
regarding the intention to file an Anders brief and requesting a response. (A 
copy of which is attached as Addendum B) On March 3, 2006, the appellant 
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sent a letter in response to that letter in essence claiming that he believed that 
he had an absolute right to withdraw his plea at any time before sentencing. 
He also claimed that he believed he had ineffective assistance of counsel on the 
basis that trial counsel told him that everything would be taken care of in his 
appeal. (A copy of that letter is attached as Addendum C) The appellant 
raised no new issues in Addendum C that had not previously been mentioned 
in previous letters requests. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel is unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this 
reason, counsel respectfully requests this Court to release him as appellate 
counsel. 
DATED this /I 'day of Marcl/2006. 
^NDALL W. RI( 
ttorney for Appellknt 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the Joxegoing BriefptAppellant to 
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the)Plaintiff/160 E^t 300 
South, 6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84 M4-0180/postage 
this tf[day of March, 2006. 
©AllV/BllCHARDS 
attorney at Law 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
HAROLD EUGENE HARMON, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051901670 FS 
On Judge: ERNIE W JONES LtC j 4 
Date: December 14, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: dianew 
Reporter: OLSEN, DEAN 
Prosecutor: BRENDA J. BEATON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RYAN BUSHELL 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 22, 1950 
Video 
(PDA) 
CHARGES 
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/01/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is before the Court for sentencing. Defendant 
present in custody from the Weber County Jail. Court 
finds no legal basis why sentence should not be imposed. 
Case No: 051901670 
Date: Dec 14, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison term imposed to run consecutively to prison term imposed in 
case 051904133 FS. 
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THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC. 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APPELLATE DIVISION 
2550 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300 
Randall W Richards Ogden, Utah 84401 
Dee W Smith Telephone: (801)399-4191 
February 22, 2006 
Harold Eugene Harmon 
Inmate #21598 
Housing U-3-401-B 
Utah State Prison 
P. O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Re: SOU v. Harold Eugene Harmon 
Dear Mr. Harmon, 
I have been working on your appeal, and have done extensive research regarding your 
complaint that the Judge should have granted your motion to withdraw your guilty plea. I have 
not been able to fmd any cases to support our position on this issue. The problem is that where 
you told the judge at the plea hearing that you had read the plea bargain agreement and fully 
understood it, the Judge had no legal reason to allow your plea to be withdrawn. The fact that 
you may have had a question about Mr. Gravis being ineffective or not diligent, but gave no 
reason for that allegation, does not rise to the level required to withdraw a plea which would be 
that you did not knowingly enter the plea. 
The Utah Appellate Courts will not change a judge's decision on this issue unless it is so 
obvious that you did not know the rights you were giving up when you entered the plea. 
I am filing a brief saying that I can find no issue for an appeal. I have enclosed a copy of 
that brief for your inspection. If you have any other issues you would like discussed on 
appeal, please bring them to my attention within 30 days of the date of this letter. If I do 
not hear from you on further issues, I will submit the brief to the Court of Appeals unchanged. 
Attorney at Law 
RWR/mm 
Enclosure 
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